This article aims at investigating the relevant aspects of international law and cooperation in the field of renewable energy. Part I provides an overview of the multiple soft law developments within and outside the UN framework as well as an assessment of a chosen set of extant treaty obligations either fostering or potentially constraining the development of the renewable energy sector. In light of these norms, Part II analyses a series of recent cases and international disputes triggered by non-environmental interests and rights allegedly impaired by the implementation of certain renewable energy-related plans and projects. In particular, this section considers the compatibility of renewable energy development with extant norms in the areas of human rights (ECHR), procedural environmental rights (Aarhus Convention) and international trade law (WTO). Despite the scarcity of binding norms on renewable energy generation and the persistence of various factors leading to disputes, global cooperation in the field of renewable energy is gaining momentum. Starting with an overview on CDM renewable energy projects under the Kyoto Protocol, Part III then shifts to the latest developments in renewable energy cooperation prompted respectively by the creation of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and by the growing number of transnational private partnerships operating in the field of renewables.
I. Is There an International Legal Framework for Renewable
Energy? An Overview on the Current Status of Soft Law and Treaty Developments
I.1. Renewable Energy Gaining Ground on the Global Sustainable Development Agenda
Renewable energy has always been an agenda item at the global environmental conferences convened by the UN and other international fora. However, issues such as the dissemination of its related technologies as well as the relationship between renewable energy and the principle of sustainable development or the creation of international rules binding States to their use were never fully explored on those occasions. In order to have a full picture of the international legal developments on this matter, the first step is to weigh the interest that the international community has collectively acknowledged to the use of renewable energy by means of soft law. Our starting point is the recognition of the scarcity of both binding and non-binding international legal instruments on renewable energy due to the persistency of interests sustaining the exploitation of traditional energy sources as well as of market imperfections and technical constraints hampering a wider reliance on renewable energy. 1 The 1987 Bruntland report by the World Commission on Environment and Development, considered as a milestone of international environmental law for providing a first definition of sustainable development, labelled renewable energy as an 'untapped potential' and considered that renewable energy should be the "foundation of the global energy structure during the 21st Century". 2 However, UN Members participating at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) embraced only timidly the straightforward indication of the Bruntland Commission. In fact, among the Principles shaping the Rio Declaration, 3 only a few are of a certain relevance to the renewable energy sector. Besides the Principle 2, which combines the sovereign right over natural resources with the prohibition of transboundary harm (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas), 4 of particular relevance are Principle 17, on environmental 1 impact assessments (EIA), and Principle 10, on access to justice and information in environmental matters. These Principles will be later explored, referring to some disputes involving the generation of energy from renewable sources. Furthermore, no proper focus on energy appears in Agenda 21, where specific references on renewable energy can be tracked only in conjunction with the protection of the atmosphere. 5 Therefore, during the process that led to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), energy was identified as one of the areas requiring further efforts in order to fully implement Agenda 21. To this end, the "Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity Working Group" (WEHAB-WG) proposed "A Framework for Action on Energy", 6 extensively marking renewable energy as a key driver of sustainable development. However, WEHAB recommendations were only partially welcomed by the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPoI), 7 which was deprived by the participating delegations of a thematic section on energy issues. The JPoI, in fact, concentrates on renewables and energy efficiency as cross-cutting issues (for poverty eradication and in the context of the needed changes to the patterns of consumption and production). 8 The choice made at the WSSD is ascribable to the preeminence accorded to developmental issues over the environmental ones as well as to the endorsement of the 2000 Millennium Developmental Goals (MDGs). 9 To some extent, this was counterbalanced by the recommendation to implement the work carried out in 2001 by the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD).
10 CSD-9, in fact, had set the floor for international cooperation in the energy sector. Amongst its conclusions, premised on the acknowledgment that 'energy is central for achieving the goals of Id., paras. 9(a)(e), 20. Instead, the WEHAB-WG also underlined the need for a 'dedicated global institution' with a specific mandate on assisting developing countries in the use of renewable energy, supra nt. 6, 12.
sustainable development' 11 and that 'energy resources are plentiful, and environmentally sound technological options exist and should be made available by developing countries to developing countries' 12 pursuant to the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' principle (CBDRs), 13 some identify renewable energy as a key issue. The increased development, utilisation and dissemination of renewable energy technologies are seen as the main challenges, significantly, for developed and developing countries alike.
14 Notwithstanding this recognition, in 2007 the CSD had to take note of the impossibility to reach a consensus on the need to adopt measurable targets for renewable energy. In fact, while praising the adoption of voluntary commitments by some countries, CSD-15 concluded that 'the mention of time-bound targets proved to be one of the areas in which agreement could not be reached'. 15 Meaningful political commitments in the field of renewable energy are steadily lacking also from the acts adopted during the more recent 2012 Rio+20 UN Summit. 16 Its final document, short of reflecting any State consensus on the recognition of a basic right to energy, conclusively affirmed the existing interlink between access to energy and sustainable as well as human development. 17 On this premise, UN Members built their commitment to facilitate the access to energy services to the 1.4 billion people currently deprived thereof.
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11 Id., Decision 9/1 on "Energy for sustainable development", para. 1. CSD-15 reinforced this conceptual knot affirming that 'energy is crucial' also for poverty eradication, for the 12 Id., Decision 9/1, para. 3. 13 Id., paras. 5, 7. As pointed out, the CBDRs principle (Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration) does not enjoy legal autonomy for it must be translated for implementation into treaty-based norms establishing dual regimes for the attainment of environmental/developmental objectives, see Munari, F. and Schiano Di Pepe, L., supra nt. 4, 47. See also Pauwelyn, J., "'The End of Differentiated Treatment for Developing Countries? Lessons from the Trade and Climate Change Regimes", Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law, vol. 22, ed. 1, 2013, 29-41, calling for further differentiation so as to overcome the paradigm of developed/developing countries. 14 See Decision 9/1, para. 16. Amongst recommended actions, CSD-9 proposed the promotion of renewable natural resources (solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, hydro and ocean) to partially meet energy needs for sustainable development, para. 17(e), the development and use of indigenous sources of renewable energy, para. 17(g) and the development and implementation of measures to make renewable energy technologies more affordable, para. 17(h). 15 See E/CN.17/2007/15, supra nt. 11, para. 11, as also envisioned by Redgwell, C., supra nt. 1, 101 . It has been recently suggested that 'as energy governance will continue to follow the "bilateral model", progress in the multilateral negotiations toward decarbonisation will remain elusive because the fossil energy path made possible at bilateral level will predetermine the pace and effectiveness of the multilateral decarbonisation negotiation'. See Viñuales, J. E., supra nt. 2, 11. 16 Held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on 20-22 June 2012, focused, respectively, on green economy in the context of poverty eradication and on the enhancement of the international governance for sustainable development. 17 According to some, an individual right to energy ( However, no preferential footing in this respect seems to have been specifically acknowledged to the use of renewable energy. On the one hand, although its contribution is deemed important and thus encouraged, renewable energy technologies might not always pass the agreed-upon 'test' set in order to qualify for international financial cooperation as 'modern energy services'. 19 On the other hand, the sovereign right of States to choose the energy mix they deem more appropriate to meet their legitimate developmental needs is left untouched (renewable energy and cleaner fossil fuel technologies are formally regarded as equal options for sustainable development).
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The limited support for renewable energy emerging from the UN's soft law puzzle clashes with the greater activism independently shown by States favouring the proliferation of other ad hoc initiatives. Said activism is proved by the fact that from 2004 onwards already five International Renewable Energy Conferences (IRECs) have been held, respectively, by the Governments of Germany (Bonn), 21 China in 2005 (Beijing -BIREC) the United States in 2008 (Washington -WIREC), India in 2010 (Delhi -DIREC) and the United Arab Emirates in 2013 (Abu Dhabi -ADIREC) on the issue of renewable energy. 22 The first IREC was convened in Bonn and paved the way to its successors by producing a Declaration that already went well beyond what fragmentarily expressed by previous (and later) UN Conferences by clearly stating that renewable energies combined with energy efficiency, can significantly contribute to sustainable development, to providing access to energy, especially for the poor, to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, reducing harmful air pollutants, thereby creating new economic opportunities, and enhancing energy security through cooperation and collaboration. 23 In Bonn, consensus was gathered also on the urgent need to increase the share of renewable energy in the total energy supply, and Participating States reaffirmed their 19 Id., para.126, according to which they are to be provided 'in a reliable, affordable, economically viable and socially and environmentally accepted manner in developing countries'. This formula forged by the CDS-9 (Decision 9/1, paras. 3, 12, supra nt. 11, gathered consensus both at the WSSD, see JPoI, para. 20 (a) and Rio+20 Summit. 20 Id., para. 127. 21 29 See Beijing Declaration, para. 9. On CDM, infra § 3.1. 30 See DIREC Declaration, para. 11 and COP15 Decision 2/CP15 "Copenhagen Accord", available online at <unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4> (accessed 23 January 2014). 31 See ADIREC Declaration, para. 10.
terms of international cooperation and/or setting quantified targets), reaching only second-best outcomes (i.e. the drafting of soft law declarations and the setting of broad policy targets). In some circumstances, however, States decided to bind themselves to rules directly addressing the renewable energy sector. This process of norm creation has been mainly facilitated at a regional level thanks to the participation of a small number of States. A number of global treaties, as we shall see, also entail norms applicable to/implementable through the developments in this field.
In the Eurasian context (between the EC and CIS States), cooperation in the energy sector, through the trade and investment liberalisation measures, was underpinned by the creation of a common legal framework. Started off with the adoption of the European Energy Charter (a political declaration), the framework was later augmented by Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and its Protocol on Energy Efficiency. 32 Article 19 ECT emerges as the only "environmental" provision of the Treaty requiring States to minimise environmental degradation, in the pursuit of sustainable development by, inter alia, having 'particular regard to improving energy efficiency, to developing and using renewable energy sources, to promoting the use of cleaner fuels and to employing technologies and technological means that reduce pollution'. 33 The Protocol, instead, entails more meaningful obligations concerning the development of laws, policies and regulations (Article 3), energy efficiency strategies (Article 5) and programs (Article 8). this as a key factor of cooperation. This is fortified by the presence of an ad hoc provision on 'renewable energy sources'. Article 6, in fact, establishes that these sources shall be given 'preferential treatment' by virtue of their environmentally friendly characteristics (paragraph 1), be exploited by decentralised plants (paragraph 2), 37 used in combination with traditional technologies (paragraph 3) and rationally used as not to impair the sustainability of mountain forests (paragraph 4). 38 Renewable energy, as mandated by the Protocol, shall be taken into account by Contracting Parties in order to produce energy savings (Article 5, paragraph 1, b), as well as a substitute for fossil-fuels when technically, economically and environmentally feasible (as expressly required for existing fossil-fuel thermal plants: Article 8, paragraph 2).
It has been argued that States' domestic jurisdiction has been eroded by international cooperation on energy issues. 39 In the light of the provisions on renewable energy addressed above, however, this argument might need specification. On the one hand, the said provisions do not substantially bind States to undertake any definite course of action with respect to the use and dissemination of renewable energy since they rather set, in a broad fashion, the conditions for cooperation and assistance. On the other hand, in most cases, they are heavily qualified. Such conditions are also inherent to the obligations set under major MEAs, such as the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. 40 This Convention is relevant to renewable energy developments as far as its Contracting Parties are required to control their sources of anthropogenic GHG emissions and to favour climate change mitigation by adopting programs to these ends while also streamlining climate change, to the extent feasible, in the preparation of their social, economic and environmental initiatives. 41 The Protocol, for its part, mandates Annex I Parties to 'implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with national circumstances' on research and development of renewable energy technologies. 42 In this regard, it must be highlighted, however, that the Protocol provides its Contracting Parties with the possibility of undertaking additional efforts (complementing domestic ones) under the so-called 'flexibility mechanisms' in 37 The provision refers solely to the use of solar, biomass and hydro-power, suggesting that negotiating States might have experienced difficulties in finding consensus on the inclusion of other renewable sources (e.g. wind energy 41 See UNFCCC, Article 4, para. 1 (b) and (f). On the implicit relevance of these provisions to renewable energy production and dissemination, see Bradbrook, A., supra nt. 4, 116. 42 Emphasis added. See KP, Article 2, paragraph 1, (i) and (iv).
Articles 6 ('Joint Implementation') and 12 ('Clean Development Mechanism'). Although only indirectly related to the use of renewable energy technologies, these instruments, addressed as a matter of international cooperation, certainly hold the potential to sustain their increase in the world energy supply. 43 There are, however, branches of international law relevant to the renewable energy field by virtue of the negative obligations imposed on the conduct of States. Such norms may affect States' policy choices when regulating the renewable energy sector. 44 In this sense, particular relevance is to be attributed to the multilateral trade rules agreed upon in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). From an international trade standpoint, the increasing importance of the utilisation of clean technologies for the realisation of sustainable development results in a renewed interest toward the compatibility between 'green policies' and multilateral trade rules. Despite a reference to the importance of sustainable development in the WTO Agreement's Preamble, 45 the covered agreements do not provide for any specific discipline regulating trade in energyrelated products and services, 46 let alone the trade in clean energy technologies. As a consequence, their trade obeys the same multilateral rules other goods are subject to. 47 The relevance of WTO rules in non-trade areas is demonstrated by the fact that, unlike other legally binding instruments (e.g. multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)), the WTO system provides for a well-functioning dispute settlement mechanism empowered not only to decide on the legality of certain national measures, but also to authorise the suspension of trade concessions whenever a breach of one of the WTO provisions by a respondent State results in economic damage to the industry of a 43 See Quadri, S., 2012, supra nt. 36, 94 and Chandler, W., "Technological implications", in: Bradbrook.
A., ed., supra nt. complainant State. 48 Moreover, under certain conditions, the system allows WTO Members to enact unilateral trade remedies. 49 The lack of specific regulatory instruments within the WTO gives rise to two main sets of issues. One question WTO negotiators have been facing concerns the market access of renewable energy related products. The Doha Development Agenda (DDA), 50 providing a specific section on 'trade and environment', calls WTO Members to negotiate the 'reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services (EGS)'. 51 In relation to renewable energy, the breakthrough of this proposal would have the immediate effect of lowering the price of essential technologies for renewable energy generation. However, negotiations on EGS have immediately stalemated due to the impossibility of reaching consensus on a general definition of environmental goods and because of the WTO Members' tendency to propose lists of products solely reflecting the interests of their national industries. 52 So far then, notwithstanding the general plea in the WTO Agreement Preamble to promote sustainable development and climate change mitigation, market access rules for EGS remain subject to the general WTO principle of non-discrimination enshrined in the WTO agreements and the general Lists of tariff concessions annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol. The OECD/Eurostat defined the industry of environmental goods and services as consisting of 'activities which produce goods and services to measure, prevent, limit, minimise or correct environmental damage to water, air and soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and ecosystems. This includes cleaner technologies, products and services that reduce environmental risk and minimise pollution and resource use. environmental products are not immune from unilateral and multilateral actions if it is demonstrated that they have benefited from export subsidisation or illegal dumping practices. 56 In this sense, mounting trade tensions between major producers and importers of renewable energy technologies have already resulted in unilateral actions aimed at countervailing the negative effects of (alleged) export subsidisation and dumping practices.
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The second issue resulting from the lack of a WTO discipline tailored to renewable energy relates to the uncertainty about the compliance to the ASCM of financial incentive schemes enacted by governments as a response to energy security and climate change concerns. 58 At the present status of technological development, government intervention (either direct or indirect) is a crucial component of many public policies aiming at stimulating the dissemination of renewable energy technologies. 59 Under the ASCM perspective, this practice can raise particular problems. Indeed, even if explicit prohibitions are exclusively provided for with regard to two types of measures (export and import substitution subsidies as established by Article 3.1), other types of specific subsidisation, 60 regardless of their stated goals, can be 'actionable' through the DSB if resulting in an 'adverse effect' within the meaning of Article 5 and 6 of the ASCM. 61 At the outset, the ASCM included a provisional waiver for subsidies granted in pursuance of certain specific goals, among which was the 'adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements'. 62 This exception, however, lapsed after five years in 1999, leaving prohibited and actionable categories as the only two possibilities to define a specific subsidy for WTO purposes. 64 It results that, at the moment, uncertainty remains mainly with regard to the compatibility of government subsidisation programs for renewable energies with the "specificity" and "adverse effect" tests foreseen in the ASCM. 65 As further illustrated below, the DSB jurisprudence might be of great help in clarifying to what extent the ASCM rules constrain the WTO Members' policy space when it comes to incentivising the production of energy through renewable sources.
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II. Renewable Energy Generation as a Trigger For International Disputes
The utilisation of renewable energy sources for the production of electricity may lead to disputes involving the impairment of private interests to the benefit of the public interest. disputes. In this regard, tensions concerning the market access of renewable energyrelated products have already resulted in the significant utilization of trade defence instruments, both anti-dumping and countervailing duties, by the EU and the US against solar panels imported from China. Furthermore, the allegedly protectionist provisions of 'local content requirements' (LCRs) in a Canadian regional policy on clean energy production have led to a long-awaited WTO decision which touches upon the very delicate relationship between WTO subsidy rules and climate change incentives. 69 This section attempts to analyse these disputes in the light of the relationship between renewable energy and sustainable development as a principle of international law.
II.1. Renewable Energy Generation and the Protection of Human
Rights: a comment on the Fägerskiöld v. Sweden ECHR case
The facts underpinning the commencement of Fägerskiöld v. Sweden before the ECtHR concern the granting of construction permits for three wind turbines neighbouring the applicants' property in the municipality of Ödeshög. The property, in particular, was bought as a second home and used for recreational purposes. 70 When the third turbine was erected in 1998 the applicants publicly denounced the disturbance caused by the noise and the light effects produced by the wind power plant. In front of the ECtHR, they retained that the operation of these turbines prevented them from fully enjoying some rights protected under the 1950 European Charter of Human Rights as the right to respect of private and family life (Article 8), the right to property (Article 1, Protocol N. 1) and the right to effective domestic remedies (Article 13). 71 In sum, when decided on the admissibility of the case, the Court dismissed all claims as ill-founded.
While easily finding that the applicants had not in fact exhausted the available domestic remedies, the Court reflected on the possible admissibility on the basis of the other two alleged violations. As concerns Article 8, while admitting the absence from the Convention of any right to 'a clean and quiet environment', 72 the Court also reaffirmed that an individual may be affected by noise and pollution likely to cause an infringement 69 74 the Court focused on the severity test, according to which in order to raise an issue under the provision at stake 'interference must directly affect the applicants' home, private and family life and the effects of the environmental pollution must attain a certain minimum level of severity', 75 two criteria satisfied by the circumstances of all Article 8 cases. In the case at hand, the Court admitted that the combined nuisance caused by the turbine noise and blades rotation was direct; however, after an assessment of the evidence reproduced by the applicant carried out in light of i) international noise standards ii) requirements set under the Swedish legislation and iii) a comparison with the noise levels reached in other Article 8 cases, the Court determined that the nuisance did not amount to 'severe environmental pollution '. 76 Similarly, the allegations under Article 1 of Protocol 1 were also ill-founded in the Court's view. In relation to this provision, the Chamber had to decide on the proportionality of the alleged violation of the right to property and the general interest being pursued through the operation of the wind power plant. In this regard, it verified the lawfulness of the building permits issued for the construction of the third (particularly controversial) turbine against Swedish legislation and found no infringement, before passing to the test of the general interest attached to electricity generation and finding it to be superior to the negative impacts suffered by the applicants. Some aspects of the reasoning used by the Court to decide on the admissibility of Fägerskiöld v. Sweden are interesting as they repeatedly touched upon the relationship between renewable energy and the principle of sustainable development (crucial to understand in order to develop any international obligation on renewable energy). 77 To a certain extent, for instance, the Court seemed to embrace the allegation of the Swedish Government affirming that the necessity test ex Article 8, paragraph 2 is a priori satisfied, in relation to wind power plants, thanks to the peculiarities of this energy source and its related technologies (they being environmentally friendly and contributing to the sustainable development of the society).
It must be admitted, however, that this faith in the utilisation of a renewable energy technology would not have appeared as such had the Court found that the adverse effects 73 Fägerskiöld v. Sweden, supra nt. 167, 14. 'The Court has constantly affirmed that the positive obligation to undertake adequate measures in order to protect the right under Art. 8 primarily involves the adoption of a legal and administrative framework ensuring the effective prevention of environmental and human health damages. ' of the debated developments were actually reaching the degree of severity registered in other cases. In fact, the task of the Court is not to pronounce itself on the desirability of the activities likely to cause nuisance but rather to assess their compatibility with the rights protected by the Charter as, in certain circumstances, their effects may be detrimental to the enjoyment of those same rights. In relation to the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol N.1 affirming that 'no one shall be deprived of its possession except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided by law and the general principles of international law' the Court went beyond the only apparently unconditioned support to renewable energy generation. In fact, when assessing the negative impact of the wind turbines on the enjoyment of the right to property against the general interest pursued through their operation, the Court found the interference to be proportionate and explicitly attached great relevance to the 'positive environmental consequences of wind power for the community as a whole'.
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The implications of this decision are significant, even though not much has been added to the solid ECtHR environmental jurisprudence. In particular, the Court acknowledged the existence of a direct link between renewable energy generationinherently implicating a less likely degree of interference with the rights protected under the Convention -and sustainable development, the latter being characterized both as a public and general interest, on the basis of which States can legitimately authorize activities interfering with the use of property.
II.2. Renewable Energy Generation and Procedural Environmental
Rights 82 According to the complainant, EU institutions failed, inter alia, in monitoring the 'implementation of EU law related to the Convention' by Ireland, with respect to the preparation and subsequent communication of its NREAP. 83 The Compliance Committee ultimately decided to centre its final evaluation around this issue, dismissing other allegations concerning State aid as well as those on the implementation of EU environmental legislation. 84 Specifically, the Committee found Ireland's NREAP to fall into the definition of plan and program requiring public participation as set under Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention, since it had established 'the framework for activities by which Ireland aims to enhance the use of renewable energy in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions'. 85 However, giving that authorities responsible for the identification of the concerned public were the Irish ones and Ireland is not a Party to the Convention, the Committee was unable to reach a conclusion on 'direct' compliance with Article 7. Accordingly, it turned its attention to the requisites for public participation singled out by directive 2009/28/EC because, as stated in the findings, while the integration of such requisite was a choice of the EU, 'it is the task of the Committee to examine whether the Party concerned has indeed properly implemented Article 7 of the Convention'. 86 In the light of this, the Committee analysed the obligations under Article 4 of the directive 87 and held them as of 'very general nature', contemplating 'minimum requirements' for Member States not in line with those concerning public participation established by Article 7 of the Convention. In this regard, it specified that measures consistent with the latter provision would have required Member States to report on the public participation arrangements made for NREAP preparation, on how information was made available and, most importantly, would have been set within a regulatory framework incorporating the requirements under Article 6, paragraph 3, 4 and 8 of the Convention, ensuring the availability of adequate time-frames for informing the public providing the conditions for effective participation.
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On this point the Committee observed that consultation with the public in the case a quo were carried out in a limited time-span and that it would not have been so had the EU included standards in line with Article 7. 90 Finally, having ascertained EU failure in ensuring implementation of this provision ('by way of its monitoring responsibility'), the Committee recommends ending non-compliance. 91 Although only incidentally related to renewable energy, the Committee's findings have interesting EU and international law implications. On the one hand, they deal with the consistency of EU secondary legislation with agreements ratified by the Union and with the implementation of their principles by Member States not having ratified them in the first place but contextually bound by virtue of Article 216, paragraph 2 TFEU. On the other hand, the findings should be taken into account for developing any international law instrument entailing procedural environmental requirements for renewable energy plans and project.
II.3. Renewable Energy Generation and Trade Defence Instruments: A Comment On EU Unilateral Trade Measures Against Chinese Solar Panels
Due to the growing economic relevance of trade in renewable energy technologies, the application of countervailing or antidumping duties in this field is becoming an increasingly common practice. In an effort of safeguarding national producers from unfair competition, WTO Members have reacted very quickly when alleged anticompetitive practices enacted by third countries and manufacturers were threatening their national industries operating in the same field. 92 At the moment, China is by far the larger exporter of solar photovoltaic (PV) technologies and its trade balance vis-à-vis the US and the EU has grown exponentially in the last few years. 93 Not surprisingly then, 89 Id., para. 94 Consequently, the US is now applying additional tariffs ranging from 24% to 36% on most of the solar PV cells originating from China. 95 Similarly, the EU has initiated four parallel investigations aimed at verifying the existence of export subsidies and dumping practices on certain solar PV products imported from China. 96 One of these has already led to the imposition by the European Commission (EC) of a provisional (six-months) anti-dumping duty on Chinese solar PV amounting to an average 47% 97 calculated as the minimum threshold in order to counteract the negative effect of the dumping practice. 98 The concerns of States and industrial sectors feeling threatened by unfair competition practices are justifiable as one thinks that a large amount of imports of low-cost renewable energy generators from third countries can delay, if not prevent, the development of a national industry, with a series of implications in terms of tax collection, jobs losses and self-sufficiency. 99 However, the imposition of further duties on renewable energy goods may raise concerns if seen from other perspectives. Trade defence instruments to renewable energy technologies, for instance, seem to run counter to the aforementioned DDA objective of market opening for environmental products. 98 The other investigations are expected to reach provisional or final conclusions by end of 2013. 99 All EC anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigations were initiated following a complaint lodged by EU Pro SUN on behalf of EU companies representing more than 25% of the total Union production of the technology at stake. 100 The cases addressed here might be seen as an indicator of the reasons behind the failure of EGS negotiations.
Furthermore, the imposition of additional tariffs (either anti-dumping or countervailing measures) to the import of solar PV from China may not be in the interest of the whole industry operating in the upstream and downstream markets. Significantly, right after the commencement of the investigations against the allegedly WTO-inconsistent practice of China, many EU and US-based companies started to fear the potentially negative effects likely to be caused by the imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing measures on solar PV for the global solar value chain. 101 Finally, from the consumer's perspective, it is easy to argue that countervailing and anti-dumping duties, whether legitimate or not, have the immediate effect of increasing the costs of technologies needed for the production of clean energy (i.e. the cost of solar installations), ultimately increasing the average price of energy from renewable sources, to the detriment of end-users.
Safeguarding the interests of subjects other than national industries is certainly not the main objective of trade defence measures. WTO relevant agreements (ADA and ASCM) do not require parties to take non-trade interests into consideration when applying antidumping and anti-subsidy duties. 102 Conversely, however, the EU system envisages specific rules for this purpose. Before applying any trade defence measure, in fact, the EC must undertake the so-called "Union Interest test" by which trade concerns of EU companies damaged by the alleged unlawful behaviour of third Parties are weighted against the interest of the society as a whole. 103 The Union Interest test is based on "an appreciation of all the various interests involved", including, in the case of Chinese solar panels, "those of the Union industry, companies in the upstream and downstream markets of the PV sector, importers, users and consumers of the product concerned". 104 For this reason one can consider the test as offering an ideal platform for discussing sustainability goals in the context of trade defence measures. However, in deciding on provisional anti-dumping duties against Chinese exporters, the EC seems to have opted for a narrow interpretation of the test so to exclude the possibility for it to encompass wider sustainability and environmental concerns.
In assessing the harm likely to be caused by the imposition of an anti-dumping duty, the EC focuses greatly on the impact of an increased pricing for undertakings operating in the upstream and downstream markets and for the end-users. 105 Only under the heading "other arguments" the thorny issue of the contrast between the imposition of anti-dumping duties and the renewable energy goals of the 2020 Agenda is briefly addressed. 106 Significantly, in deciding on the imposition of trade defence instruments, the EC quickly dismisses this important point by stating that "the 2020 goals do not depend on the solar energy exclusively. Equally important are other green energies such as: wind, biomass, hydro etc. Since no particular percentage is attributed to the solar energy for the 2020 goals, a slightly lower number of PV installations is not expected to raise the overall cost of the 2020 Agenda" adding that "the price of solar panels is only one of many factors, which are vital for the development of the PV industry in Europe".
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In light of the above, it might be tempting to argue that the economic importance of the case and the political will to react quickly to the threat posed by cheap import of solar technologies have led the EC to refrain from investigating further on the relationship between trade remedies and renewable energy policies. 108 Forthcoming decisions on antisubsidies and anti-dumping will certainly be of great help in confirming or discarding this interpretative position.
II.4. Renewable Energy Generation and WTO Subsidy Rules: The WTO Consistency of Financial Assistance Programs and their Local Content Requirements in the Canada -FIT Program dispute
Compatibility concerns with regard to WTO rules and renewables have been mounting also in the context of domestic climate change incentives for the production of clean energy. 109 The first, and so far the only decision by a WTO Panel and the Appellate Body (AB) regarding the consistency of financial assistance programs for renewable energy generation was reached in relation to the 'Ontario Feed-in Tariff Program (FIT Program)' at the request of Japan and the EU. 110 Similarly to other government assistance schemes, the Canadian Program is a comprehensive guaranteed pricing structure aiming at increasing the production of electricity from certain renewable energy sources with the two-tier goal of improving air quality and diminishing the dependence on coal-fired energy generation 111 . In order to boost investments in this otherwise non-profitable business, the Ontario FIT Program offers fixed and favourable long-term contracts for the purchase of electricity. 112 One of the requirements for eligibility of operators to the FIT Program and the main target of complaints from WTO Members is the inclusion in each renewable energy), pursues other two goals: reducing GHG emissions by 20% from 1990 levels and raising by 20% the overall EU's energy efficiency. Said goals are core to the 2020 Agenda. See European Commission, "Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth", COM (2010) project of a "minimum amount of goods and services that come from Ontario". 113 This requirement entailing a local content obligation (LCR) is explicitly adopted for the purpose of enabling "new green industries through new investments and job creation".
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Japan and the EU asked the Panel to rule on the legality of the FIT Program's LCR with both the general non-discrimination clause provided for in GATT Article III:4 115 and the subsidy discipline of the ASCM.
As for the first claim, the Panel and then the AB had no difficulties in demonstrating the clear discriminatory character of the LCR and that no exception could be invoked.
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In rebutting Canada's claim according to which the FIT Program would constitute a form of government procurement, as such exempted from Article III applicability, the Panel noticed that the commercial character of the transaction in the FIT program (the energy ultimately being sold to consumers) prevented the applicability of the exception. The AB reversed the Panel's reasoning -but not the final decision -by highlighting that the government procurement exception of GATT Article III:8 could not be invoked insofar as the product being allegedly procured (electricity) was not the same product being allegedly discriminated because of its origin (generation equipment).
117 In distinguishing between the two different products, the AB probably aimed at clearing the field from the misconception that energy-related products are to be subjected to a more lenient WTO discipline merely because of their specific function. In the end, as requested by the complainants, the LCR was declared inconsistent with GATT Article III and also with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 118 Secondly, the Panel and the AB were asked to rule on the consistency of the LCR with the ASCM. The complainants alleged that the FIT contracts constituted a prohibited subsidy within the meaning of ASCM Article 3.1(b) because the granting of a favourable treatment was contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. 119 In these circumstances, before turning to the analysis of the import substitution measure (the LCR, in the case at hand), it is necessary, to determine the existence of the subsidy itself. For WTO purposes a subsidy exists when a financial contribution is granted and a 113 See, 'FIT Program Overview', Version 2.1, Ontario Power Authority, para. 3.1, available online at: <fit.powerauthority.on.ca/sites/default/files/page/FIT_Program_Overview_Version_2.pdf> (accessed 2 February 2014). 114 WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R, supra nt. 69, para. 7.65. 115 Mandating that "the products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use". 116 On this point, Canada contended that FIT contracts constituted "laws and requirements that govern the procurement of renewable electricity for the governmental purpose of securing supply for Ontario consumers from clean sources" and were thus covered by the provision of GATT Article III:8(a) exempting government procurement from the non-discrimination principle. WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R, supra nt. 69, para.7.88 et seq. 117 WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R, supra nt. 69, para. 5.79. 118 The claimants further asked the DSB to find the inconsistency of the FIT program with Article 2 of the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement). According to TRIMs Article 2.1, a measure constituting a TRIM within the meaning of Article 1, which is also inconsistent with GATT Article III:4, violates the TRIMs Agreement. 119 ASCM Article 3 distinguishes between prohibited and actionable subsidies. Subsidies contingent upon export and upon the use of domestic over imported goods (import substitution subsidies) fall within the "prohibited" category and cannot be maintained by WTO Members.
benefit is conferred. 120 In the present dispute, both the Panel and the AB found that the FIT Program amounted to a financial contribution within the meaning of ASCM Article 1.1(a)(1).
121 However, with regard to the benefit, the Panel was of the view that, in the specific context of the electricity market, government intervention is always necessary in order to safeguard a safe, reliable and long-term sustainable electricity supply.
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For this reason, the Panel concluded that a free marketplace for electricity could not exist. Hence, it was not possible to find an appropriate market benchmark to verify that the FIT contracts conferred a benefit within the meaning of ASCM Article 1.1(b) . 123 The reasoning of the AB on the benefit partially departed from the Panel's. The AB in fact refused to confirm the Panel's view that the relevant market for the determination of the benefit is the whole electricity market. Instead, it ruled that, taking the supply mix decided by the Ontario government as given, the relevant market against which a benchmark needs to be found to prove the conferral of a benefit is the specific market for wind and solar generated electricity shaped on the basis of the energy-supply mix determined by the government. 124 Consequently, the benchmark for the comparison of the FIT Program fixed prices is to be found in each specific market. Eventually, however, neither the Panel nor the AB were in the position to identify an appropriate benchmark for comparison. Therefore the existence of a subsidy for ASCM purposes could not be ascertained.
The decision on the Ontario FIT Program has been the first in which the DSB addressed the delicate subject of subsidies and renewable technologies. If the decision with regard to the discriminatory nature of LCRs has not received any criticism, the reasoning of the Panel and the AB with regard to the definition of the benefit has raised more perplexities. Indeed, some important divergences on how to define the existence of the benefit had already emerged among the Panel experts, with one of the adjudicators issuing a dissenting opinion on this specific point.
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120 See ASCM, Art. 1. 121 Although reaching the same conclusion with respect to the characterization of the financial contribution at issue as a "purchase of goods" under ASCM Article 1.1(a)(1), the AB reversed the Panel's finding that the categories for the characterization of a subsidy are mutually exclusive. See WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R, supra nt. 69, paras. 5.121-5.128. Interestingly, the litigants never questioned the existence of a "financial contribution" within the meaning of the ASCM. However, the possibility for a pricing requirement such as a FIT Program to amount to a financial contribution has been questioned in doctrine because it has been maintained that such a minimum price purchase requirement should be intended as a market regulation activity. See, Howse, R., "Climate Mitigation Subsidies and the WTO Legal Framework: a policy analysis", IISD Paper 2010, 12. Contrary to the concept of subsidy as defined in WTO Agreements, the ECJ has ruled that minimum price purchase requirements for renewable electricity cannot constitute "state aid" within the meaning of Article 87 TEC because it does not entail a transfer of State resources. See CJEU, Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, 13 March 2001, ECR I-02099, paras. 59-60. 122 According to the Panel, modern electricity systems "by their very nature, need to draw electricity from a range of diverse generation technologies that play different roles and have different costs of production and environmental impacts", see WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R, supra nt. 69, para. 7.320. 123 Id., para.7.312. 124 The AB considered that government intervention resulting in the creation of a market which would not otherwise exist does not impede treating the resulting price as "market price" for the purpose of the benefit analysis. WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R, supra nt. 69, para. 5.185. 125 In criticising the decision, the dissenting judge and some commentators pointed out that, by refusing to acknowledge that a benefit is conferred, the Panel first and the AB later erroneously mixed up two different analytical dimensions. It has been maintained that, by trying to justify the absence of the benefit through the impossibility of finding a benchmark within the Ontario energy market, the Panel had implicitly justified the existence of the subsidy already in the benefit analysis. This, being a preliminary stage of the overall evaluation, should only have been aimed at the investigation of potential trade distortion of the measure at stake. 126 The justification of the subsidy at issue could have become relevant at a later stage, namely in the context of the determination of the specificity of the measure or its adverse effect. 127 Instead, it has been argued, by confusing the two different dimensions the Panel and, to a lesser extent, the AB, have missed the opportunity to proceed to the next phases of the analysis in which policy objectives, such as energy supply reliability and environmental sustainability, could have been raised as a possible justification for the adverse economic effect generated by the subsidy. This could have led to a much clearer understanding of the possible recognition, within the WTO, of a legal shelter, or at least a greater level of tolerance, for those domestic measures specifically targeted to renewable energy objectives.
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Criticism aside, it should be noted that, in overturning the Panel's reasoning by recognizing the existence of different relevant markets for each specific generation technology, the AB has implicitly ascertained the peculiarity of renewable technologies for the production of clean energy. This, coupled with a clear stand on the impossibility for WTO Members to question the legitimacy of each government definition of the appropriate energy supply mix, might render it difficult in the future to challenge the legitimacy of domestic climate change financial schemes not containing LCRs. Finally, from a more pragmatic standpoint, it is difficult to imagine why, in the absence of a discriminatory LCR, a WTO Member should embark in a costly and politically sensitive WTO dispute to challenge another Member's feed-in tariff scheme. 129 In any case, it is left to the upcoming DSB decisions to confirm or overturn the reasoning developed by the AB in the FIT Canada dispute.
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III. Some Aspects of International Cooperation in The Field of Renewable Energy
Despite the reticence on the definition of global quantified renewable energy targets, the absence of binding norms on renewable energy generation and the persistence of various factors leading to disputes, global cooperation in the field of renewable energy is gaining 126 As noted, "one thing is to find that there are sound economic and policy reasons for the government to step in and direct the economy, surely quite another to suggest that we should not call an out-of-themarket incentive as such, only because it is a good one". See L. Rubini, supra nt. 66, para. 57. The AB however disregarded this position by confirming that the Panel 'did not err in using Article 14 of the ASCM as a context to determine whether a benefit is conferred under Article 1.1(b)', WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R, supra nt. 69, paras. 
III.1. The Kyoto Protocol and CDM renewable energy projects
It has often been highlighted how the utilization of renewable energy is a key to the achievement of sustainable development. This relationship should also inform the conduct of international cooperation. It has been observed in particular how increasing the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix, while maximising energy efficiency and guaranteeing universal access to energy services is a crucial tripartite challenge for the international community as a whole. 131 Alternative sources of energy are one of the means to accelerate poverty reduction and cut the bulk of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions responsible for anthropogenic global warming with the help of utilityscale renewable power projects and more flexible small-scale renewable energy systems.
132 Therefore, unprecedented political, financial and technological cooperation is required at all levels to achieve the globally agreed targets on sustainable energy. Notwithstanding these pressing needs, international cooperation in the field of renewable energy is supported only by a few ad hoc international (mostly regional) norms and is conducted in the absence of an efficient institutional framework (which is in turn the product of a fragmented and dispersed global environmental governance).
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131 Supra § 1.1. The International Energy Agency (IEA) however projects a challenging future for the three targets requiring more rigorous policies and stronger political engagement, although new deployment of energy-efficient technologies were announced in different countries and new targets were set (e.g. the US opted for new fuel-economy standards, the EU hopes to cut by 20% its energy demand no later than 2020, Japan intends to reduce by 10% its energy consumption by 2030 while China plans to cut back by 16% its energy intensity before 2015). Notwithstanding commitments, the energy efficiency target will still not be achieved, according to the IEA estimations. Equally, the share of renewable energy in the world energy mix will still be small, though it has grown steadily (in 2010-2011 renewables provided for about 16.7% of global energy consumption). In this scenario, the EU advanced in reaching its goals: the portion of energy from alternative sources has increased constantly from 7.9% in 2004 to 12.7% in 2010. As for energy poverty, IEA considers that future investments should be at least five times the level of 2009 (9 billion USD). Increasing financing will presumably not be easy due to the diminishing political will of industrialised countries struggling with growing national debts. As briefly anticipated, one of the early instruments that up until now has been promoting joint action among States in the renewable energy sector is the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP) to the UNFCC. The KP can be regarded as the fruit of a large consensus on the seriousness and legitimacy of pressing climate change concerns and the inevitability of undertaking binding commitments in order to curb carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions. When entered into force in 2005, after a difficult ratification path, the Protocol's so-called 'flexibility mechanisms' were finally set in motion. KP Article 3 mandates the general obligation of Annex I Parties 134 to ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic GHG emissions do not exceed their assigned amounts, 'with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012'. Flexibility mechanisms were inserted in the Protocol in order to facilitate compliance with this provision and to enhance cooperation among all the UNFCCC Contracting Parties. Thus, Article 6 establishes a Joint Implementation (JI) system whereby Annex I Parties may transfer or acquire emission reduction units among themselves 'resulting from the projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy'.
The second instrument provided by the KP is known as Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). From a technical standpoint, the CDM projects work the same way as the JI ones with the only exception that they are aimed at reducing emissions in the territory of developing countries (Non-Annex I Parties). The CDM pursues a twofold purpose: to assist developing countries 'in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention', while helping developed countries to respect their commitments under Article 3. Lastly, Article 17 enables an 'emission trading scheme' where extra carbon credits resulting from the implementation of the JI and the CDM projects can be traded. The provision actually created a new commodity and a new 'carbon market', as carbon dioxide accounts for 56.6% of all the anthropogenic GHGs.
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Notwithstanding the obligation under Article 3 and the provision of flexibility mechanisms, the Protocol does not require the adoption of renewable technologies as a mandatory method for cutting GHG emissions. 136 However, during the negotiations following the adoption of the Protocol, several developing countries expressed the view that renewable energies should have been specifically given priority within activities under the CDM. 137 Thus far, this proposal remained only on paper. 139 However, the Protocol does not exclude investments in renewable energy either, but rather encourages them through its flexibility mechanisms designed to supplement the efforts undertaken by Annex I countries in achieving their national targets of emission reduction, particularly the CDM. In fact, 70% of the total amount of the CDM projects from the start of the crediting period until the end of 2012 are related to renewable energies. 140 By the analysis of the data, it might appear that the mechanism is indeed serving well in expanding and providing support to renewable energies. Yet, the significance of renewables lessens if the weight of the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) credits issued for different projects is taken into consideration. Project developers in fact opt mostly for ventures that capture and eliminate gases with high global warming potential, namely hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs), per-fluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF) and nitrous oxide (N 2 O). 141 These types of activities received 58% of CERs, twice the amount issued for the projects related to renewable energy (25%). 142 Ventures in the field of renewables usually create smaller volumes of emission reductions and sustain higher total investments per project.
A comparison between two large-scale CDM projects may highlight downsides encountered by clean energy initiatives. On the one hand, there is a Dutch investment company that financed a project for conversion of SF 6 into alternative cover gas SO 2 at a Brazilian magnesium plant. On the other hand, there is a Spanish energy company that invested in a 61.5MW wind farm in South Korea. Total investment was roughly estimated to be at around USD 1.4 million in the Brazilian project and USD 123 million in the case of the Korean one. But whereas the conversion initiative creates emission reductions equal to 274,715 tCO 2 e per year, the wind farm delivers less than a half, 112,812 tCO 2 e per year. 143 In addition, transaction costs under the CDM mechanism may overlapping of mandates. 152 Certain doubts might arise apropos of its relationship with the UN and the likelihood that it might cover part of the same activities, thus making IRENA a duplicate of a UN institution active in the renewable energy sector. In spite of the fact that IRENA's Statute mentions the importance of principles and policies of the UN, 153 the concerns that the new Agency might lose its original purpose in the wide network of the UN institutions are groundless. None of the UN agency or program is dedicated to the sole matter of alternative energies. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has a general task to assist developing nations in all kinds of environmental activities and to advise on policies that are not limited to climate change mitigation but include wise environmental management and technology transfer for sustainable development. 154 Another UN body, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), focuses on development and collaborates with poor countries in capacity-building to integrate environmental considerations into their domestic policies. 155 However, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) promotes mainly cleaner energy and environmentally sustainable use of electricity in the industrial and agro-processing sectors. 156 One institution having common operational ground with IRENA is the IEA. However, given its limited membership (OECD countries only) and its extensive work in other energy-related domains (i.e. energy security, economic development through stable energy supply, analysis of the traditional energy sources employment), renewable energy issues do not constitute its main focus. 157 Some might recall that other two institutions operate in the renewable energy sphere, the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) and the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), potentially challenging IRENA initiatives. However, it must be recalled, both REN21 and REEEP are nongovernmental organisations. 158 Whereas REN21 has indeed certain goals in common with the Agency, being a multi-stakeholder network and a fine platform for knowledge exchange and joint action development, REEEP is mostly involved in hands-on operations and has so far gathered funds for over 180 clean energy projects in 58 countries (on the contrary, IRENA's Statute does not contemplate any provision on direct financing of green projects).
Recognising the possibilities that could stem from the collaboration with these two organisations, on the basis of its Statute (Article XIV), 159 IRENA forged strategic partnerships by signing two joint Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). In August 2011 the Agency and REEEP agreed on a partnership to cooperate, exchange information and expertise and implement various programs and best practices. 160 A closer collaboration between the Agency and REEEP will be beneficial as the latter has already secured a group of donors to appropriately fund the projects and has acquired the necessary field experience. IRENA, in turn, could guarantee fundraising to seek a financing support from other states and non-governmental organisations. Later, in January 2012 IRENA and REN21 signed a MoU in order to enhance their mutual efforts in the deployment of renewable energy. 161 The above-mentioned partnerships will help IRENA expand its range of activities, giving an impulse for developing new ways of promoting renewable energy worldwide.
However, establishing relationships with other organisations 'to ensure added value in the work with external partners' 162 is not the only goal of IRENA. Pursuant to its Statute and 'Medium-term Strategy', released in January 2013, the Agency operates independently as well. The 'Strategy' expressly states a mission of IRENA which consists in being 'the principal platform for international cooperation, a centre of excellence on renewable energy and a repository of policy, technology, resource and financial knowledge' 163 and in supporting 'countries in their transition to a renewable energy future'. 164 Basically the mission represents a concise version of Article IV of the Statute and gives the essence of IRENA's raison d'être. The 'Strategy' moreover elaborates and articulates in detail the specific strategic objectives of the Agency. Article II of the Statute in fact gives only a general idea of what IRENA's objectives are: promotion of 'the widespread and increased adoption and the sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy'. 165 In its turn the 'Medium-term Strategy' outlines three main equally important objectives, three pillars, upon which IRENA should build its leadership in renewable energy cooperation. First, the document reaffirms the primary goal of becoming a centre of excellence for renewable energy in order to provide a comprehensive existing and IRENA-originated information and to avoid an information overload as well as to organise proactive communication between stakeholders providing analytical and policy advice.
166 Second, the Agency should become a 'renewable energy advisory resource for countries' in order to assist them with the advanced technical knowledge and to help enhancing institutional, legal and business frameworks for a better investment environment. 167 Third, IRENA envisages itself as a 'network hub of country, regional and global programs' as a means to create transparency over financial support mechanisms and facilitate cooperation between different stakeholders on various levels. 168 As a matter of fact, the lack of information hinders investments. An array of financial mechanisms might be in need of a centralised coordination. A step in the right direction, chosen by the Agency, is a creation of a unified database with all the possible financial solutions (including the Global Environmental Facility, the World Bank, the UN backed funds and private sector grants) for various potential investors.
On the basis of the objectives and the provisions of the Statute, the Agency's practice has been developed in three main areas: 1) knowledge, policy and finance issues; 2) country support and partnerships; 3) promotion of innovation and spread of information on new technologies. One of the latest initiatives, developed in collaboration with the UNEP, concerns the creation of a Global Atlas for Solar and Wind Energy. Internetbased maps and data on solar and wind energy resources will provide systematic and reliable information helping to identify areas with high renewable energy potential and to direct cooperation.
Another important activity initiated by IRENA is Renewables Readiness Assessments (RRAs). 169 Initial studies were conducted in 2011 in Senegal, Mozambique and Kiribati, two African nations and a small island nation in the Pacific, where renewable energy was already deployed but where further development would be needed. 170 The fourth RRA report concerned the Caribbean Island of Grenada, whose government is willing to accomplish an ambitious transition from an oil-dependent economy into one where renewables would be a primary energy source. In each case the RRAs delivered evaluation and analysis of national potential and conditions for the deployment of renewables and the development of a renewable energy market. It aimed at giving a comprehensive vision of how a State could harness clean energy and contribute to its own economic development while becoming energy independent. An RRA report usually assesses all economic aspects related to energy (i.e. transportation and electricity generation) and the renewable energy endowment of the country. It moreover identifies and recommends particular actions to scale up the use of alternative energy. Alongside the advice services, IRENA is also committed to the promotion of educational programs 166 IRENA Doc. A/3/DC/13, supra nt. 162, paras. 14-17, 167 Id., paras. 18-24. 168 Id., paras. 25-27. 169 RRA presents, in a form of a report, an evaluation of a country's renewable energy situation in its whole and suggests necessary actions to improve the overall state of affairs in the renewable energy sector. 170 those plants will supplement the electricity coming from already existing intermittent renewable energy generators (PV and wind turbines). The project was initiated by the DESERTEC Foundation, an NGO established in 2009 by the German Association of the Club of Rome and a group of scientists, economists and politicians interested in alternative energy. The DESERTEC Concept was created as a result of their collaboration. It consists in harnessing renewable energy in places where it is largely and almost constantly available and, once converted into electricity, transmitting it to centres of demand. The concept was first developed for the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region and aimed at interconnecting Europe and Northern Africa in order to export electricity generated from renewables to the European countries thus pursuing two goals: to guide developing countries along the sustainable development path while bringing more clean energy to EU countries. Early activities took place in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt and mostly concerned the development of technical skills and expertise. The DESERTEC Foundation, for instance, has recently participated in the TuNur-project, 177 an initiative designed to produce clean energy in the Tunisian desert and export it on the other side of the Mediterranean.
178 All these activities demonstrate the existence of an expanding interest towards the development of transnational renewable energy networks. Private initiatives thus coexist alongside States and international organisations by virtue of their inherent characteristics (more flexibility, efficiency, productiveness) can further stimulate the global expansion of the renewable energy sector.
IV. Conclusions
Renewable energy generation is key for the attainment of sustainable development and climate stabilisation. Empowering the world through the use of renewable resources certainly stands amongst the biggest challenges facing the international community. Nevertheless, States are not always keen to embrace a global basis for renewables as demonstrated by many soft law instruments. More significantly, renewable energy developments are not supported by any legally binding norm, let alone any ad hoc agreement, entailing a detailed discipline on renewable energy generation. On the contrary, as it has been discussed, international binding norms negotiated for different purposes and in different fora can incidentally limit the policy space of States willing to pursue renewable energy goals.
As suggested by the outcome of the cases chosen here for their either direct or indirect relevance to the production of energy from renewable sources, such activity, although per se desirable, must be carried out consistently with State obligations in the human rights area and must guarantee an effective exercise of environmental procedural rights from the public. Furthermore, in the absence of internationally binding instruments setting a positive discipline for renewable energy generation, the pursuit of renewable energy goals through national policies cannot alone justify the departure from binding international trade rules. Any international legal development fostering renewable energy generation should integrate these concerns to the greatest extent possible. 177 TuNur Ltd. is a joint-venture formed by NurEnergie, a multi-technology solar power plant developer and Tunisian investors. It has been developing the TuNur Project, an export initiative between Europe and Tunisia. 178 More information about the TuNur Project can be found at <tunur.tn> (accessed 19 February 2014).
However, international cooperation in the renewable energy sector shows positive trends of development. The past reluctance to address clean energy needs, as observed in the Kyoto Protocol-related negotiations, brought certain difficulties in the deployment of the renewable energy projects under the CDM. Given the falling costs of clean technologies and an ever-growing interest in preventing negative effects from climate change, any new climate change agreement should be framed to give priority to renewable energy investments. Meanwhile IRENA has been established and developed its initial practice, making its way through a network of existing international organisations operating in the field of renewables. Today IRENA has a solid strategic base allowing the Agency to carry out its programs and activities in a transparent and independent manner, due also to the various partnerships it has built. IRENA has positioned itself as a remarkable platform for international cooperation in renewables but further analysis will be required to see how the Agency succeeds in reaching its objectives. Nonetheless, cooperation is not confined to States' initiatives, characterised by slowness and difficulty in finding compromise between multiple interests. Indeed, more flexible private transnational cooperation may also prompt further development of renewable energy amongst State and international organisations. 
